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 THE  CONSTITUTION  AND THE CITIZENS – 
(NOT) MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? 
 
  
 
 Abstract 
While the Convention on the Future of Europe and its product, the Draft Constitution, might be 
considered a successful endeavor by many European policy-makers and other academic and 
socio-economic elites, it received little positive attention by the citizens. Aside from being a 
highly specialized and, for the ordinary citizen, complicated matter, few people actually are 
aware of the Convention process and the content of the Constitution. In this paper, I will locate 
the public awareness of the Constitution among the EU’s population, lay out some basic ideas 
about the democratic legitimacy this act entails and look at ways that could facilitate the 
Constitution’s acceptance in the future. Finally, I argue that, given the institutional structure of 
the EU and organizational constraints of the Convention, so far the democratic legitimacy has 
been sufficient but still awaits the challenge of ratification. 
 
Introduction 
The recent disagreement among major member state governments regarding the rules and the 
allocation of votes in the Council has stalled progress on the concluding negotiations of the Draft 
Constitution. But it did not only result in a waste of goodwill and time for this major reform 
project, but also disenchanted and confused European citizens. In some cases – most probably 
because of verbal threats of the negotiation partners – even doubt about the general future of the 
Union developed. Just recently one of the major actors in the development of the EU, Jaques 
Delors, warned that if the disunity and trend towards intergovernmentalism would continue, in a 
mere 15 years the political Union could fall apart.
1 
  
It appears ironic that the founding document which gave the impulse to convene and draft 
an EU Constitution, the Laeken Declaration of 2001, was born out of acknowledgment that with 
all the integration process and involvement of the EU in national politics, a more democratic 
legitimate and accountable Union was necessary.  
 
“Within the Union, the European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens. 
Citizens undoubtedly support the Union’s broad aims, but they do not always see a connection 
between those goals and the Union’s everyday action. They want the European institutions to be 
less unwieldy and rigid and, above all, more efficient and open.”
2  In view of this, not only 
would a Constitution legitimize the EU for the citizens more strongly, a politically anchored 
                                                           
1 “Pessimistic Delors warns against European deconstruction”, http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/539133-
421?204&OIDN=1507084 , March 31, 2004. 
2 “The Future of the European Union. Laeken Declaration.”, in: Shaw, Jo et al (eds). Ibid, pp. 138-139.   2 
Union with a Constitution would also symbolize a single external identity as a global actor. This 
aspect has received increased attention with the many foreign policy challenges that occurred in 
the last decade and discussions about the general leadership within the Union in this policy field. 
  
In this paper, I first take a look at the role of the civil society representatives in the 
Convention, discuss some of the theories treating the Convention as part of democratic 
accountability and unity efforts and finally, evaluate quantitatively and qualitatively popular 
support for this project. The topic of popular support for and meaning of the Constitution is 
important, but has not received much attention in the literature. However, a more abstract 
discussion about the well-known democratic deficit and general legitimacy of the Constitution 
has taken place amongst scholars in the field.
3 
 
The Convention and Popular Representation 
 
The Convention, which was in part set up to enable increased input by all concerned groups 
within the member states according to the Laeken Declaration,
4 involved besides EU and 
national government representatives various civil society groups. At first sight, this process 
represented a step forward towards democratization of the EU, compared to previous inter-
governmental conference (IGC) decisions made only by the heads of member states. If in fact the 
resulting Draft Constitution has brought more accountability and transparency for the people in 
the EU, it is currently a much-debated issue receiving more attention below. 
 
The various delegations that made up the Convention – the national governments and 
their parliamentary representatives, the European parliament members, the representatives from 
the acceding states as well as members from the Commission and the Committees of the 
Regions, the Economic and Social Committee as well as a few other conventionnels – were 
guided under the presidium headed by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Some analysts argue, though, 
that there was an under-representation of certain groups (e.g. Euro-sceptic organizations or 
minorities), which compromised the Convention’s democratic representativeness.
5  Euro-sceptics 
and democracy-advocates will point to a conscious effort to exclude potentially difficult parties. 
My take on it is rather the wish to proceed with the Convention in a timely manner, since the 
work on the Constitution itself was to be concluded before the European elections in June 2004 
and a strongly diversified composition would have led to lengthy debates. Related to this point is 
the critique on the Convention president’s autocratic leadership style, which was at times 
perceived as too dominant.  
 
                                                           
3 See: Magnette, Paul. “Will the EU be more legitimate after the Convention?”, in: Shaw, Jo et al (eds). The 
Convention on the future of Europe. London: Federal Trust, 2003, pp. 21-41. 
4 For more information on the impact of the Laeken Declaration on the preparation and implementation of the 
Convention, see: Luzarraga, Francisco A. The First Outcome of the Debate on the Future of Europe: Between 
Deepening and Revision (2000 – 2002). Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 2, No. 2, February 2003. 
5 Closa, Carlos. “Forging European Constitutional Patriotism: Deliberating on the Constitution within the 
Convention”. CIDEL (Citizenship and Democratic Legitimacy in Europe) Working Paper, 
http://www.arena.uio.no/cidel/workshopZaragoza/CClosa.pdf, April 7, 2004.   3 
Aside from its composition, the sole purpose of the Convention was to draft a consensus-
based Constitution for the member states. As such, the Convention members were relatively free 
from reelection pressure and thus theoretically more inclined to deliberately work towards the 
common good. At the same time, national interests were vitally expressed by the member state 
governmental representatives participating in the Convention (e.g. during the voting rights issue 
in the Council). 
 
  Features designed to make the Convention more visible to the public “included the public 
nature of plenary sessions, the full availability of documentation via the website, and the 
structured – if not always successful – consultation with civil society, via the Forum and its 
website and via a specially convened plenary session in June 2002.”
6  The Forum, consisting of a 
network of civil society organizations primarily from NGO’s, the business and the academic 
world was invited to follow the Convention and provide input via the website and at specially 
held meetings with Convention members.
7 The inclusion of those organizations and interest 
groups is essential because civil society groups can help in observing and translating Euro-jargon 
into political terms and concepts ordinary citizens are able to understand. They are also 
imperative when it comes to distributing information to the wider, politically interested audience 
and as such have an important communicative function.
8 At the same time they play only a 
minor role in delivery and persuasion of relevant political messages, compared to the print- and 
audio-visual national media, which are the main information provider for citizens. 
 
In addition, a specially designed website for the general public was set up by the 
Commission to supply information on the proceedings of the Convention and to engage more 
intensively with the citizens in a public debate.
9  However, there is no possibility for individuals 
consulting the ‘futurum’-website to influence in any way the Convention, aside from 
commenting in a discussion area online. Also, the few thousand entries by those individuals 
recorded on the website are a poor turnout compared to the whole population of the current 
Union. A Youth Convention was held in July 2002 to take up concerns of the younger 
generation, which critically could be regarded as an EU public relations effort since most of 
these participants were selected by the Convention members themselves.
10 
 
  Part of the deeper problem with popular involvement in the Convention is the complex 
subject matter dealt with in often rhetorical Euro-jargon, even though one of the Convention 
goals was to simplify preceding treaties in this revision and thus, make them more 
understandable and efficient. “When debates are cast in technical terms, deprived of passionate 
rhetoric and remote from the citizen’s common sense, they do not draw the attention of the 
general public and do not help citizens understand the issues at stake.”
11 
 
                                                           
6 Shaw, Jo et al. (eds). Ibid, p. 17. 
7 For more information, see the website: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/index_en.htm , April 4, 
2004. 
8 Bertelsmann Foundation & Centre for Applied Policy Research, “Civil Society and the Convention”, Convention 
Spotlight 2002/06, www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/ spotlight/Spotlight_06-02_en.pdf, April 5, 2004. 
9 For more information, see the website: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/index_en.htm , April 4, 2004. 
10 Futurum Website, http://europa.eu.int/futurum/civil_society_en.htm, April 4, 2004. 
11 Magnette, Paul. Ibid, p. 32.   4 
  The media played (or rather, it did not play) its part in the insufficient dissemination of 
information about the Convention. In political theory, “democratic legitimacy in complex 
societies derives from the interplay of institutional consultation and decision-making operations 
with informal, media-transmitted, opinion formation processes within a public sphere of 
communication”.
12  European print and audio-visual media are therefore necessary to provide 
information about political processes upon which citizens can build their arguments. In the case 
of the Convention, there has been a lack of media attention which is reflected in the 
overwhelming unawareness and lack of knowledge, as will be shown in the public opinion 
section of this paper. As Paul Magnette poignantly states, “the fact that the Convention has been 
largely ignored by the European press, and the absence of public debate outside the small circles 
of ‘Europeanized’ citizens – not to mention the comedy of the ‘Forum’ – are clear illustrations of 
the limit placed on this ‘public’ deliberation”.
13 Realizing this problem, the current Irish 
Presidency set up a conference in April 2004 to address the communication deficit, and to look 
for ways to improve the EU’s communication strategies, which in turn only affected Eurocrats 
and national governments. 
 
Democratic Legitimacy of the Draft Constitution and the Constitutional Process? 
 
The question of democratic legitimacy of the Convention and the draft development is closely 
connected to the issue of the legitimacy of the EU as a whole. Without wanting to go too much 
into detail about the latter – since there is a whole field of literature reserved for that topic alone - 
and leaving questions about the finality of the Union aside, a few basic aspects of and parallels to 
the constitutional process must be considered. If it were only for a simplification of previous 
treaties, it could have been attempted during another IGC and a Constitution would not be 
required. Paul Magnette skillfully takes up this problem, asking if the EU will be more legitimate 
after the Convention. In his conclusions, he carefully expresses optimism for the outcome as 
strengthening the Union’s perception in the eyes of its population. He mentions the ratification of 
the Constitution as a key process;
14 I will turn to this issue in the last part of the paper. 
 
  Interestingly, even though Magnette depicts several aspects of legitimacy for the Union, 
only one, titled ‘indirect legitimacy’ refers to some kind of popular consensus or approval. In this 
model, the power of the EU is derived from its transfer from the constituent member states, 
whose governments received the mandate from its electorate. This model is strongly relying on 
the member states’ authority and thus, is favored by intergovernmentalists. In terms of popular 
legitimacy, this approach is disadvantageous for the prospects of public acceptance of the 
Constitution. States have an inherent advantage in that their democratic legitimacy is directly 
bound to a decisive electorate and their political power linked to constitutional demos 
constituting a strong normative body. The EU, with its multiethnic population and indirect 
legitimacy cannot rely on a ‘thick’ collective identity comparable to the ones of nation states.
15 
                                                           
12 Habermas, Juergen. So, why does Europe need a constitution?, European University Institute, 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/e-texts/CR200102UK.pdf, April 4, 2004. 
13 Magnette, Paul. Ibid, p. 32. 
14 Magnette, Paul. Ibid, pp. 37-39. 
15 Shaw, Jo. Ibid, p. 51.   5 
The question evolves if some kind of democratic super-state Europe would be the answer 
– and if this vision is the one adopted by the Convention members? Even though this is open to 
debate, critical voices like Moravcsik claim that “this whole exercise is much ado about nothing, 
a misguided attempt to fiddle with a European Union that ain’t broke, a Union as democratic as it 
should and can be”.
16  From an intergovernmental point of view, there is much to this argument, 
pointing to the fact that the EU cannot and should not be compared to conventional views of 
statehood. Implicit is a refute of the calls for more direct democracy EU-wide. This is why 
Nicolaidis suggests a new way of thinking about European democracy: As “a new kind of 
political community, one that rests on the persistent plurality of its component people, its 
demoi.”
17 Accordingly, she develops a theoretical model of an EU ‘demoi-cracy’ based on the 
sharing of identities, a community of projects and multi-centered governance, without pursuing 
forms of a super-state Europe. She invokes an active public sphere with the support of ‘real’ 
trans-European parties and the possibilities of modern communication technology. Although her 
vision is appealing, it seems illusionary with all the current problems and additional national 
interests that are constantly apparent. It is unlikely that such an abstract model of pluralist 
governance can compete with more traditional forms of popular allegiance such as statehood. 
 
  A way out of this dilemma is perceived by some as legitimization through common 
values and/or the pursuit of direct democracy. With regard to the former, in the absence of a 
unitary people bound directly to normative institutions, Habermas as a main proponent of 
‘constitutional patriotism’
18 suggests three functional challenges for the EU: First, he calls for a 
citizenship-based European civil society. Secondly, he denotes the construction of a Europe-wide 
public sphere of communication. Lastly and most importantly, he urges the creation of a political 
culture that can be shared by all citizens.
19  The current constitutional process establishes a 
foundation on which a common political culture, even with common values as included in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as part of the Constitution, could rest. But this process takes time, 
as the formation of nations proved, especially since national political cultures are still the 
predominant frameworks of political action in Europe. In a similar fashion, Fossum sees values 
(besides rights and utility) as an argument for the legitimacy of a constitution, even though he 
encounters the problem of indirect legitimacy mentioned above. Hence his conclusion “that for 
the EU to be able to foster a sense of legitimation trough values, it can not draw very much on a 
set of pre-political values in the manner that many nation-states have done. The European project 
[…] must rely more on the role of rights and the deliberative quality of the ongoing process of 
integration”.
20 The inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Constitution 
exemplifies a way of combining EU-wide rights with universal values without necessarily 
                                                           
16 Moravcsik, Andrew, cited in: Nicolaidis, Kalypso. “The New Constitution as European Demoi-cracy?”, Online 
Paper of the Federal Trust, www.fedtrust.co.uk/eu-constitution, April 5, 2004, p. 3. 
17 Nicolaidis, Kalypso, Ibid, p. 5. 
18 The best definition for the purpose of this paper states that Constitutional patriotism is “part of the idea that the 
creation of a political community is a morally transformational act in which human beings develop relationships as 
citizens that tie them together independently of their prior associational ties to family, religion and the like”, by 
Ingram, Attracta. “Constitutional Patriotism”, in: Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 22, 1996, pp. 1-18. The 
inclusion of a value-laden transformation as indication of the type of situated-ness of the individual in relation to 
society is important here.  
19 Habermas, Ibid, p. 18. 
20 Fossum, John Erik. “Constitution-making in the EU”, in: Eriksen, Erik Oddvar & Fossum, John Erik. Democracy 
in the European Union. Integration through deliberation. New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 132.   6 
stepping into the fallacy of nation-centric values. The creation of an open civic culture, however, 
takes more time and effort. 
 
  Direct democracy, in analogy to the political structures of the member states, is an 
expressed goal for many civil society groups and NGO’s involved in the constitutional process. 
They perceive of the direct influence of the people through, for example, direct elections of the 
Commission president or referenda on treaties and the Constitution as an essential, legitimizing 
part of Western democracies.
21  
 
  One of the major issues for them is the ratification of the Constitution by popular 
referenda in either a Europe-wide referendum or referenda in each member state. The European 
citizen’s initiative, inserted into the Draft in Article 46 ‘last minute’ as a way to include elements 
of direct democracy is for some critics only proof of the desperation of EU politicians who fear 
for public acceptance (and the ratification) of the Constitution. “It is vaguely worded, opens the 
door to single pressure groups and, more importantly, undermines national parliaments by giving 
citizens collectively a right which their elected representatives don’t have – the right to ask the 
Commission to initiate a law.”
22 Even though this questions the proper legitimacy of civic 
involvement over political mandate, for others it symbolizes a victory for direct participation and 
political involvement of the citizens. Will the clause requesting at least 1 million signatures in 
order to be heard, have any effect on the EU’s legitimacy and the political (dis)interest of the 
European public?  It is difficult to make a prediction for the future in that matter, but looking at 
the European Referendum Campaign, which wants to test Article 46 right away by collecting 
over 1 million signatures in favor of a Europe-wide ratification referendum on the Constitution, 
it seems to take the call for direct democracy very serious. “If legitimacy is to be strengthened 
there is a compelling case to include provisions to give a direct role to the citizens of Europe, by 
means of referenda on treaty changes, starting with the constitution itself.”
23  With what success, 
will be revealed in the coming months. 
 
  Referenda can be positive as well as negative for the acceptance of the Constitution in 
particular and for future popular consensus for the Union in general. Referenda on such an 
important issue, it is theorized, will generate attention to the topic itself and also encourage civic 
participation, besides legitimizing political decisions. O’Brian and Keohane deliver the 
interesting example of Ireland and its referenda on the Nice Treaty. While at the first referendum 
in 2001, the Treaty was rejected out of fear for possible negative implications and ignorance, the 
second referendum changed Irish perceptions. The Treaty implications and the EU were lively 
discussed in the media, in public meetings and the public sphere. Politicians were forced, in 
order not to experience the same dilemma, to explain the issues at stake to the public. “By 
polling day the issues were understood and fears assuaged. The end result was a doubling of the 
vote in favor.”
24  But calls for popular ratification do not only come from the citizens and their 
advocates. Ninety-seven of the 105 Convention members signed a petition recommending that 
                                                           
21 For more information, see the websites of OpenDemocracy, www.opendemocracy.net, TeamEurope, 
www.teameurope.info or the Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe, www.iri-europe.org.  
22 Stuart, Gisela. The making of Europe’s constitution. London: Fabian Society, 2003, p. 23. 
23 O’Brian Dan & Keohane, Daniel. “Why Europe needs referenda”, www.opendemocracy.net, April 5, 2004. See 
the campaign’s website http://www.eu04.com/index.phtml?sid=271 for more information. 
24 O’Brian, Dan & Keohane, Daniel, Ibid, p. 3.   7 
referendum in the member states be held, since a Europe-wide simultaneous referendum is time-
wise and organizationally improbable. So far, only seven of the member states agreed to a 
popular vote on the Constitution, in many cases out of fear for its refusal or because they deemed 
it inappropriate to have such a matter be decided by the people. Most states pursue a vote 
through their parliaments, even though the discussion about popular involvement is increasingly 
debated in most of the member states. Especially countries that are disappointed about some of 
the final outcomes, e.g. the voting rights issue or the preamble (Poland and Spain), or have issues 
with its sovereignty and neutrality (UK and Ireland) might be prone to signal their discontent 
either directly or via their representatives and thus, stall the European-wide ratification process.  
 
Public Opinion, the Media and the Constitution 
 
Even though many citizens in (Western) Europe can be called de-politicized already, signified by 
a lack of interest in politics and low voter turnout, still, politicians often guide their actions by 
opinion polls. In the case of the EU, there is neither a direct mandate nor are the repercussions on 
EU-politicians immediate, so that public expectations and politician’s behavior clash more often 
than at a domestic level.  
 
  For example, there is currently an astonishingly high support for the Constitution among 
the population of the EU-25. According to the latest Eurobarometer, the Commission’s public 
opinion instrument, 77 % of the population in the 25 member states is in favor of adopting the 
Constitution as of February 2004, up 10 percentage points since the start of the last IGC in 
December 2003. For the newly integrated 10 countries, the figure is only slightly lower (73%). 
Only in Sweden and the UK less than 60% of the people support it. Even in case that their 
country is asked to make concessions in order to arrive at a workable compromise, an average of 
62 % of the EU population would support such measures. Only 28 % are opposed to national 
concessions.
25 
 
  While there seems to be a strong support of the Constitution as a way to further 
strengthen the Union and its future, there exists a contradictory information deficit: 73 % of 
respondents felt not well informed about the issue at hand.
26  Regarding the highly complex 
topic, the high occurrence of ignorance about the topic is understandable, maybe even desired by 
politicians because it can then stay in the professional realm of Eurocrats. On the other hand, the 
high support expressed for the common Constitution is a missed opportunity for them to 
capitalize on an emerging constitutional EU-patriotism. A question for further research would be 
if the recorded high support will fade or remain, once the population in the member states is 
confronted with the specific conditions set out for their nation in the Constitution. 
 
  In addition to these quantitative numbers, a few observations from my current Ph.D. 
project, in which I explore the impact of post-Maastricht integration politics on citizens, help to 
illustrate the above-mentioned statistics. Last summer, I interviewed 45 people in three different 
                                                           
25 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer “The Future European Constitution”, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fl159_fut_const.pdf, April 5, 2004. 
26 Eurobarometer, Ibid., pp.3-5.   8 
EU member states (Ireland, UK and Germany) to obtain qualitative, in-depth information about 
their attitudes and opinions regarding European integration and their identities. One of the 
questions of the semi-structured interviews included the perception of a common constitution. In 
the following, I take a look at the two Anglo-speaking countries and Germany. The UK and 
Ireland being strong Atlanticists, they both differ significantly in their support for the 
Constitution and the EU more generally. On the other hand, German respondents show more 
support for a federalist vision embedded in the Constitution. 
 
Of the 15 Irish citizens, which according to Eurobarometer statistics are overall in 80% 
support (+ 3 %, compared to EU-25 average) of the Constitution, only 2 did either not know or 
care enough to give an answer. However, parallel to the EU-25 statistic, 71% of the Irish 
population feels badly informed about the issue. About half of my respondents admitted that they 
have not heard or read much about it. A great majority said it is a good or very good idea. While 
those emphasized the importance of unity that would be created by a EU Constitution, the 
problem of diverse pluralistic needs and opinions is recognized as well. One person, for example, 
stated: “I think it would be very good. Except that there are so many countries in the EU, and a 
common constitution would be kind of neutral. Though it’s good to have more linkages between 
Ireland and other countries.” Another participant touched upon the issue if something would 
change for the country: “I suppose it depends on how much would change. You have your 
country and your constitution and if it works well for you and the EU changes it, people won’t be 
happy if it has major effects on them. But then again, the constitutions in our countries are very 
similar, there are only minor differences. It should be ok then”. Two people explicitly mentioned 
the importance of human rights: “If it dealt with human rights, it would mean something”. 
 
In the British case, support for the new Constitution is the lowest, with 51% for it (-26 
compared to the EU-25 average) and 30% against it. Statistically, the knowledge level in the UK 
is the same as in Ireland and the EU-25 average (71% ‘badly informed’). But out of the 15 
participants in my interviews, only 4 heard about it and felt knowledgeable enough to respond 
with something other than ‘probably a good idea’, or declined totally to comment on it. Well put 
was the following comparison: “Like a Magna Charta. It’s an important part, isn’t it? It would 
basically complete the Union. But I hope there will still be room for individuality for each 
country”. One in particular recognized the need for treaty simplification: “The European legal 
framework or foundation is a mess, you have all those treaties and it’s quite a disaster so it 
makes a lot of sense to simplify that. So I am for the idea of the convention”. About half 
mentioned again the unifying aspect of a Constitution, but critical voices were more apparent: “I 
think the EU by its political behavior tries to encourage European nationalists to feel as one, to 
regard themselves as similar. There has to be in that a strong aspect of racism” or “Ordinary 
people have to have a say in it…I know that’s really hard! Many lobbyists have influence on the 
EU that the little people don’t know about…its just such a heavy machinery that I am skeptical 
that it’s going to work”. 
 
In Germany, the picture is a bit different: while also 70% of its citizens feel a lack of 
knowledge with regards to the topic, they are the strongest supporters among the three countries 
(83 % vs. 77 % EU-25). This observation goes hand in hand with the often-mentioned notion that 
the Constitution is agreeable if it does not change too much domestically. The importance of 
defining European values seems to be very important to Germans, since this aspect was named   9 
by a third of the sample. Some thought that the Constitution had its own right by defining more 
clearly the terms of cooperation and therefore, making diplomatic interaction among EU member 
states more transparent: “Grundsaetzlich begruesse ich es, dass es nicht nur geheime Diplomatie 
gibt sondern fuer mehr Transparenz gesorgt wird, wer was fuer wichtig haelt (Generally, I think 
it’s good that there is not only secretive diplomacy, but that measures are taken to make it more 
transparent what each party wants). Other respondents feel that a common Constitution will be 
hard to achieve because of existing differences in national interests. One answer to this issue is 
particularly creative: “Ich kann mir es besser so vorstellen: jedes Land hat seine Individualitaet, 
seine Verfassung und vertritt nach aussen gleiche Interessen, um stark zu sein. Aber das ist dann 
auch genug (I can imagine that each country keeps its individuality, its constitution and shares 
common interests (only) externally, to be strong. But that’s about it.)”.  
 
However, the overall feeling of being uninformed and also the disconnect between the 
Constitution and the citizens seems to be the common thread among many respondents in all 
three member states. Part of the awareness problem lies certainly in the lack of communication 
between informed elite circles, the media and the wider audience. The majority of EU citizens 
receive their information through national television or radio channels (65% of EU-25), followed 
by national print media (43%). The Internet, which was strongly utilized by the Convention and 
Commission, in this case has only a user-rate of 23 %.
27  The dominance of the national media in 
obtaining information versus the more ‘specialized’ use of the Internet might explain the limited 
knowledge of the majority of citizens. 
 
The ‘Convention Watch’, an academic project funded by the Commission to investigate 
public perception of the constitutional process more closely, registered in most member states 
low involvement of the public. For the most part, academic and political elites took part in the 
few organized seminars and website-consultations. Unfortunately, “it seems that only those 
anyway dealing with issues relating to the EU got in contact with those initiatives”.
28  The 
recurring problem of the EU’s lacking significance for ordinary citizens and the increasing 
democratic deficit will eventually catch up during the ratification process, as will be argued 
below. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The outcome of the Constitution in terms of formal and popular ratification and acceptance is not 
yet totally determined. If not understood as delivering more democratic legitimacy and 
accountability to the public, the constitutional process might well backfire on the EU, making the 
Union more ‘un-popular’ than ever.  
 
  Will the Constitution then be viewed as a means to more democracy in the Union? Even 
though the Convention was set up to enable a wide range of opinions and input, and succeeded in 
presenting a Draft based on the consensus of the conventionnels, the unfortunate disagreement 
between major heads of governments (in particular the Franco-German versus the now dissipated 
Spanish-Polish front) destroyed in part the deliberate substance of the constitutional process 
                                                           
27 Eurobarometer, Ibid, p. 8. 
28 EUCON Project, http://www.euconline.net, April 5, 2004.   10  
created during the Convention. Basically, discussion and consensus-finding were replaced by 
bargaining and aggressive negotiations, with the effect of stirring up sentiments of national threat 
in the countries concerned
29 and possibly, reducing the value of the Constitution to just another 
intergovernmental treaty. There is, however, a strong will on the side of the past Irish Presidency 
and the acting Dutch Presidency to achieve agreement through low-key consensus building and, 
more importantly, substantial support for a common Constitution among the population through 
improved means of communication. Thus, it is really dependent on the political will of the 
member governments to create with the Constitution a basis for popular allegiance in the months 
to come, instead of letting this unique opportunity be sidetracked by national sensibilities and 
calculated interests. The change in the governments of influential countries such as Spain and 
Poland increases the chance for a positive outcome. As the outcome of the latest IGC summit in 
June has shown, there was enough internal agreement and outside pressure to enable a deal on 
the Constitution. 
 
But the signing of the Draft Constitution still leaves the major challenge. Also, the 
Constitution must face the critical test of ratification in the member states, which will probably 
produce some heated discussion and possible defeat in some cases. A problematic development 
in the last few months has been the attempt of opposition national parties to challenge the 
governing parties by calling for popular referenda, thereby using the issue as a means to discredit 
their national government and thus, focusing on national policies instead of considering it an 
important EU–wide endeavor. In particular, in the new member states the ratification process 
could be impeded by the negative stance of their governments towards the Constitution. The 
disentanglement of constitutional referenda and the European Parliament elections increases the 
chance that the referenda won’t be (mis-)used to express dissatisfaction with the EU more 
generally, but the European election outcome already cast a shadow over the Constitution 
referenda.  “If this constitution does not have the support of the people of Europe and on 
reflection is not deemed to signpost a structure for a Europe of the 21
st century, then we simply 
have to go back to the drawing board.”
30  It won’t be that easy, but the ratification process will 
provide a chance to debate the future of the EU amongst its citizen and thus, increase the 
Constitution’s significance and that of the EU’s future more generally. That is why the outgoing 
Irish presidency under Bertie Ahern urged its colleagues to engage in active campaigns to inform 
people about the Constitution in order to avoid another delay – and to make the Constitution a 
real success.  
 
 
                                                           
29 Torreblanca, Jose Ignacio. “Who’s afraid of the Convention?”, The Elcano Royal Institute, 
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/302.asp  
30 Stuart, Gisela, Ibid, p. 57. 